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Abstract: 
Modern macroeconomics empirically addresses economy-wide incentives behind economic 
actions by using insights from the way a single representative household would behave. This 
analytical approach requires that incentives of the poor and the rich are strictly aligned. In 
empirical analysis a challenging complication is that consumer and income data are typically 
available at the household level, and individuals living in multimember households have the 
potential to share goods within the household. The analytical approach of modern 
macroeconomics would require that intra-household sharing is also strictly aligned across the 
rich and the poor. Here we have designed a survey method that allows the testing of this 
stringent property of intra-household sharing and find that it holds: once expenditures for 
basic needs are subtracted from disposable household income, household-size economies 
implied by the remainder household incomes are the same for the rich and the poor. 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: C42, E21, D12, E01, D11, D91, D31, I32 
 
 
Keywords: Linear Aggregation, Representative Consumer, Equivalence Scales, Survey 
Method, Household-Size Economies 
3Governments, corporations, and the public are eager to know about the performance 
prospects of a national or regional economy as a whole, in order to evaluate and develop 
economic policies and business strategies. Macroeconomic analysis seeks to understand 
the incentives behind aggregated economic choices in the overall economy. The 
mainstream macroeconomic paradigm (1) relies upon an artificial construct, the 
“representative consumer” (2-5), whose choices always coincide with actual aggregated 
choices under any commodity prices. This idea links the behavior of the “small” (the 
household as a microeconomic unit) with the “large” (aggregated choices of households), 
motivating that the study of aggregate demanded quantities of a consumer basket reveals 
an accurate summary of incentives behind economic actions in the overall economy. The 
necessary and sufficient conditions underlying the existence of a representative consumer 
are extremely stringent, requiring that incentives driven by needs and wants of the rich 
and the poor are strictly aligned (6).
In empirical analysis of macroeconomic models a difficulty is that consumer and income 
data are typically available at the household level, and individuals in multi-member 
households have the potential to share goods within the household (housing, home 
appliances, transportation, etc.). Whenever intra-household sharing takes place, larger 
households need lower per-capita income in order to attain a certain level of material 
comfort (7), i.e., household-size economies are achieved. For maintaining the cornerstone 
assumption of modern macroeconomic theory, an extremely stringent condition is 
necessary to hold: once expenditures for basic needs of larger or smaller household types 
are subtracted from disposable household income, household-size economies implied by 
4the remainder household incomes should be the same for the rich and the poor (6). Here 
we have designed a survey method that allows the testing of this stringent property of 
intra-household sharing. The method is equipped with a tool to test whether respondents 
understand the survey’s questions and communicate credible information.  
Alignment of incentives and choices
In classical economics, incentives behind consumer choices of households are captured 
by utility functions: functions that relate the consumed quantities of goods with ordinal 
evaluations of material comfort. These functions possess structure that leads to a unique 
best choice for households that are price-takers. Mainstream macroeconomics focuses on 
the utility that an infinitely-lived dynasty (seen as a household) obtains by the 
consumption flow of a composite commodity basket throughout an infinite horizon. 
Using the neoclassical paradigm for household behavior that can be incorporated into 
macroeconomic environments with production, first, we fully characterize the class of 
utility functions of heterogeneous households that leads to the existence of a 
representative consumer: a fictitious consumer whose preferences represent an entire 
community-preference profile (the set of utility functions of all household types), and 
whose choices always coincide with actual aggregated choices under any price regime. 
These preferences are the same as the “Gorman preferences” indicated as sufficient for 
the existence of a representative consumer in other studies (3-5). We show (6) that the 
requirement that a representative consumer exists in the presence of household-size 
heterogeneity implies that a linear relationship necessarily links all equivalent incomes 
5(EIs) in an economy: household incomes that equalize the level of material comfort of 
persons living in different household types. 
Approach for estimating economies of household size 
To quantify household-size economies is to estimate EIs. Economies of household size 
take place if the additional expenditure needed by a household with an additional member 
to keep its level of material comfort at the same level as before is less than 100% of the 
EI of a one-member household. For this reason, from a set of EIs of different household 
types, it is plausible to view the EI of a one-member household as a benchmark and call it 
reference income (RI). Based on household-level income data, the one-member-
household EI can be assigned to each household member and all individuals of an 
economy can be viewed as living in separate one-member households.  
There is no general agreement on a method to determine which EIs should be used in 
official statistics. Econometricians use consumer expenditure data of different household 
types and make assumptions in order to build demand systems that identify when two 
households with different demographic composition have the same level of material 
comfort. Results are sensitive to these assumptions (10-11). Thus, the OECD and the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) use an expert who assigns EIs to different household 
types relying on her/his intuition, insights, and familiarity with descriptive statistics from 
household data (12). Still, experts disagree (13). For these reasons we have designed a 
survey method where we ask respondents to provide us with their own assessments of EIs 
for a set of household types.
6The motivation of our survey relies on the idea that respondents are experienced at 
recognizing the connection between a household’s demographic composition and the 
level of material comfort that income can buy for its members. In this sense, respondents 
are ‘real-life experts’ in assessing EIs. Pooling diverse insights of a large number of 
respondents may correct potential biases of a single expert. Our method is equipped with 
a tool that tests whether people ‘mean what they say’ (14).
It is an open question as to whether people are ‘expert enough’ to answer the following 
type of question: “What is the net monthly household income that can make a household 
with two adults and a child attain the same level of material comfort as that of a one-
member household with a net monthly income of $2,000?” Respondents must have 
sufficient information to assess EIs for households with a demographic composition and a 
level of material comfort that differ from their own actual experiences. Otherwise, 
estimates of EI may suffer from limited information bias (LIB). Moreover, respondents 
should demonstrate sufficient understanding in answering the question about assessing 
EIs. To test for this crucial aspect of survey effectiveness, we also pose an equivalent 
assessment problem using different means of representation, and then cross-check for 
consistency.
7Survey design 
Our questionnaire consists of two main parts (6). In Part A, we pre-assign a net monthly 
income for a one-member household, a reference income (RI), and ask respondents to 
state EIs for seven other household types. Each respondent is randomly assigned one of 
several RIs. The question asked is of the following type: “What is the net monthly 
household income that can make a household with two adults and a child attain the same 
level of material comfort as that of a one-member household with a net monthly income 
of $2,000? What income would one need if, instead, there were two children in the 
household?” 
In Part B we pose an equivalent assessment problem to this of Part A, using different 
means of representation to cross-check for consistency: Likert-scale evaluations (15) of 
material comfort. The question we ask is: “Consider that the net monthly household 
income of a household with two adults and one child is $5,500. State a number from 1 to 
100 that best characterizes the level of material comfort of this household, given that ‘10’ 
is ‘very bad,’ ‘50’ is ‘sufficient,’ and ‘90’ is ‘very good.’” Respondents receive such a 
question for the one-member household and the seven household types of Part A. 
Household incomes evaluated in Part B were obtained through a previous pilot study in 
Germany using the same RIs as in Part A (16). If a respondent states a Likert-scale value 
for a household type with pre-assigned income Y that is higher than what she/he stated 
for the one-member household with the RI in Part B, then, in Part A, this respondent 
should have stated an EI for that household type that is lower than Y. 
8Testing whether “people mean what they say” 
The existence of a common, “cardinal” perception of verbal characterizations such as 
“good” or “bad” is not guaranteed (9). This problem can make stated Likert-scale values 
in Part B noisy across individuals. To suppress such inter-respondent noise we construct 
the variable “normalized Likert-scale evaluation” (NLSE). The NLSE uses the stated 
Likert-scale value concerning the one-member household as a benchmark, and measures 
the deviation of each other Likert-scale value stated by the same respondent from this 
benchmark. If people “mean what they say,” the NLSE should be negatively correlated 
with deviations of the stated EIs from the RIs provided in Part A (17).
Consistency between responses in Parts A and B of the survey is tested through the 
inclusion of NLSE in regression analysis. In our sample, NLSE exhibits low variation 
across respondents, and a large fraction of respondents have NLSE values equal to or 
near zero (6). All coefficients of NLSE are negative (see Table 1) and exclusion tests are 
always rejected (P<0.001), supporting the premise that the survey elicits credible 
information (6). The reason why NLSE should be included as a conditioning variable in 
the regression is that it can control for deviant opinions by some respondents about 
household-size economies, e.g., about the costs of children (18). Nevertheless, the 
estimated NLSE coefficients indicate that such effects are small. 
9Testing for LIB 
To test for LIB, we distinguish answers from respondents who state an EI for the 
household type and/or living standard that is the same as their own, from answers given 
about the same household type and/or living standard by respondents whose 
characteristics are different. The presence of LIB is tested in regression analysis through 
a test of exclusion of dummy variables that identify this relationship between 
respondents’ personal characteristics and the features of households that respondents 
evaluate. Generally, LIB does not exist, or it is small when present: only in 2 tests out of 
21 cases LIB dummy coefficients are significant (P<0.05), and only in one case the 
exclusion test is rejected (P<0.01) (6). Still, in these two cases the impact of LIB on EI 
estimates is small. LIB tests show that respondents exhibit a sufficient ability to evaluate 
hypothetical households with characteristics different from their own. The NLSE tests in 
conjunction with these LIB tests show that the agreement concerning EI assessments 
among the groups of respondents distinguished by the LIB dummy variables is not due to 
common misunderstanding. 
In regression analysis we use a large set of other personal characteristics of the 
respondents as conditioning variables. Education plays a small role, with the more 
educated respondents stating higher EIs, but only for household types with children. 
Probably, more educated parents pursue higher education for their children. Respondents 
who live in the former East Germany stated moderately higher EI values in all cases (19).
No other personal characteristics appear robust (6).
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Patterns of Household-Size Economies 
The scatter plots of responses in Part A of the survey appear in Figure 1. They suggest 
that the relationship between EI and RI is linear: for all seven household types, a sixth-
degree polynomial least-squares curve is hardly distinguishable from a linear fit (for the 
fourth RI (EUR 2,750) only, the polynomial fit indicates a slight deviation downwards).
F tests of the linear specification in regression analysis indicate that the linear 
specification is never rejected at P<0.01: test statistics vary within the moderate values 
from 2.36 to 3.60, and the coefficients of RI dummy variables are small. All straight lines 
appearing in Figure 1 have a positive intercept (P<0.001), indicating the presence of fixed 
costs in consumption (e.g., minimum housing rents, basic nutrition, heating, etc.). Fixed 
costs in consumption are a plausible explanation about why household-size economies 
are smaller when the RI is low (20). When income is low, household members are forced 
to spend higher shares of income on vital needs, such as food and clothing, minimum 
housing space, expenditures with, plausibly, low sharing potential.
This linear relationship among EIs is also present in all pilot studies we have previously 
run in six countries, appearing in Figures 2 and 3. Figures 2 and 3 present the scatter plots 
for purchasing-power-parity (PPP) adjusted Euros for Germany in year 2006. A sixth-
degree polynomial fit is visually close to a line, and the linear specification test passes 
(P<0.001) in all 42 cases examined (6). What distinguishes these pilot studies from the 
11
present survey is that smaller samples have been used and each respondent stated EIs for 
all RIs.
Conclusions
A challenge with estimating household-size economies is that the extent to which people 
share goods within a household is a ‘black box,’ difficult to observe or measure directly. 
Our survey instrument in its pilot form, where the same respondent is called to evaluate 
five different RIs, revealed a robust linear pattern between EIs and RIs (see Figures 2 and 
3). This regularity is astonishing, but it could be that respondents approximate the 
connection between RI and EI using a linear rule of thumb, and that the average of such 
linear mappings is still linear. Yet, when each of five independent groups of respondents 
evaluate a different RI, finding the linear pattern between RI and EI again (see Figure 1), 
supports the premise that such a simple pattern pervades economic incentives and 
decisions. This interpretation of the finding is validated by the fact that respondents must 
think of what decisions members of hypothetical households make before stating their EI 
assessments. 
The surprising simple relationship among EIs lends support to the stringent assumption 
made by macroeconomists, that the rich and the poor have the same orientation in their 
incentives and actions, responding similarly to, say, oil-price changes: so, whole 
aggregate demands in markets may behave as if driven by a single representative 
individual. Yet, having EIs linearly related is only a reconfirmation of a necessary 
condition that should hold if the Robinson Crusoe paradigm is true, not a solid proof of 
12
the paradigm itself. So, further study and more stringent tests of the paradigm are needed. 
Most importantly, why this surprisingly simple pattern is present begs for an answer, 
which might come from evolutionary theory, sociological theory of social norms, or from 
evolutionary biology examining the natural tendency of humans to imitate/cooperate.
Not least, quantifying household-size economies is of separate value on its own: it is 
potentially useful to epidemiological studies assessing how social inequalities and 
stressors affect health outcomes in a society (21); to studies examining the connection 
between child poverty and child outcomes (22); to the development of sociological and
ethnological theories of the structure of the family and cultural transmission (23-24); to 
economic explanations of fertility trends (25); to the design of welfare systems for 
children and single parents (26-27). In particular, for the formulation of applied models 
that address policy issues related to marriage decisions (28), fertility (29), and labor 
participation decisions (30), accurate estimates of household-size economies are an 
essential prerequisite and ‘goodness-of-fit’ criterion. Our study has suggested and tested a 
reliable instrument to estimate household-size economies. 
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Table 1. Summary of ordinary least squares regressions. Endogenous variable: ratio of equivalent 
income stated by respondents divided by reference income. Number of observations: 2,042; p-values 
of F-tests in brackets. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01,  * p<0.05. 
 Household type 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Constant 1.06*** 1.12*** 1.20*** 1.42*** 1.44*** 1.53*** 1.61***
Reciprocal of 
reference income 269.74*** 498.34*** 728.85*** 329.38*** 592.99*** 839.25*** 1,079.86***
Dummy 
reference income 
equals 1,250 Euros 
0.00 -0.00 -0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.04
Dummy  
reference income 
equals 2,000 Euros 
0.02* 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.02
Dummy  
reference income 
equals 2,750 Euros 
-0.02* -0.04** -0.07** -0.05* -0.08** -0.11*** -0.13***
Normalized Likert-
scale evaluation -0.04
***
 -0.07*** -0.10*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.09*** -0.13***
Same family type 
of respondent 0.04 -0.01 -0.14
* 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Same living 
standard of 
respondent 
-0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.00 -0.03 -0.05 
Same family type 
and living standard 
of respondent 
-0.06 0.13 -0.03 0.05 
-0.16* -0.02 -0.04 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.53 0.54 0.30 0.46 0.52 0.54 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference-income 
dummy variables 
2.36 
[0.07] 
3.07*
[0.03] 
3.29*
[0.02] 
3.60*
[0.01] 
3.37*
[0.02] 
3.45*
[0.02] 
3.51*
[0.01] 
Figure 1.   Scatter plots of stated EIs in  
Part A of the survey for each RI and  
each family type.  
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Figure 2. Scatter plots of stated  
equivalent incomes. 
6th degree polynomial fit 
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Figure 3. Scatter plots of stated  
equivalent incomes. 
6th degree polynomial fit 
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Part 1: Theoretical Results
Objective . Using the neoclassical paradigm for household behavior that can be incorpo-
rated into macroeconomic environments with production, ﬁrst, we fully characterize the class
of utility functions of heterogeneous households that leads to the existence of a representative
consumer: a ﬁctitious consumer whose preferences represent an entire community-preference
proﬁle (the set of utility functions of all household types), and whose choices always coincide
with actual aggregated choices under any price regime. Then, we show that the requirement
that a representative consumer exists in the presence of household-size heterogeneity implies
that equivalent incomes (EIs) are necessarily linked through a linear relationship.
Background studies and new results presented in this study. For a set of heterogeneous
households that live for one period and decide once and for all about the consumption of
diﬀerent consumer goods, Gorman (S1) has shown that the indiﬀerence curves of a represen-
tative consumer are non-intersecting if, and only if, Engel curves for all traded commodities
are always linear and parallel across all households for any given price regime. In a later
study Gorman (S2) has shown that, for Engel curves to be linear and parallel, utility func-
tions must meet a particular functional property; this property has led Pollak (S3) to a
complete characterization of the set of utility functions of households that allow the ex-
istence of a representative consumer, under the assumption that all utility functions are
additively separable with respect to each diﬀerent good. Concerning households that act for
more than one period, in particular for households that are inﬁnitely-lived dynasties, previ-
ous work has focused on households that consume a single composite consumer basket and
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accumulate ﬁnancial wealth over time: Chatterjee (S4) and Caselli and Ventura (S5) have
identiﬁed household utility functions that are suﬃcient for the existence of a representative
consumer. Here we complete their work by showing the set of utility functions that is also
necessary for the existence of a representative consumer (see Theorem 1 below in this Sup-
porting Material). With this new comprehensive result, we can ﬁrmly claim that, following
the mainstream macroeconomic paradigm, the existence of a representative consumer in the
presence of household-size heterogeneity implies that EIs are necessarily linked through a
linear relationship.
Description of the Economic Environment
Time is continuous and the time horizon is inﬁnite, t ∈ [0,∞). Households are all
inﬁnitely-lived and comprise a constant set I of diﬀerent types, with generic element i. The
set of household types can be countable, ﬁnite, or a continuum. It can also be that all house-
holds are of the same type, but in all cases there is a “large” number of households, making
each of them having negligible impact on the aggregate economy, or else, all households are
price-takers. Assume a measure μ : I → [0, 1], which has a density, dμ, with,
inf {dμ (i) | i ∈ I} > 0 . (1)
So, if I is ﬁnite, dμ (i) > 0 for all i ∈ I, whereas if I is a compact interval, dμ (i) is
continuous on I and bounded away from 0. Households of diﬀerent types can diﬀer with
respect to their initial endowment of capital claims (assets) and also with respect to their
labor productivity which is given by the exogenous function of time, θ
i
: R+ → R+. Asset
holdings for household i ∈ I at time 0 are denoted as a
i
0
.
There is a single private consumable good. Household preferences of each i ∈ I, are
given by the general additively-separable utility function with a common across households
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rate of time preference captured by the positively-valued function ρ : R+ → R++, where
U
i
((
c
i
(t)
)
t≥0
)
=
∫
∞
0
e
−
∫
t
0
ρ(τ)dτ
u
i
(
c
i
(t)
)
dt . (2)
Assumption 1 For all i ∈ I, u
i
: R+ → R, is twice-continuously diﬀerentiable and
such that u
i
1
(c) > 0 and u
i
11
(c) < 0 on some interval, C
i
⊆ R+, with both u
i
1
(c) < ∞ and
−∞ < u
i
11
(c) for all c ∈ C
i
⊆ R+,with c
i
≡ inf (C
i
) < sup (C
i
) ≡ c¯
i
.
Assumption 1 secures that, for all i ∈ I, there is a choice domain, C
i
⊆ R+, which is an
interval, and where standard desirable properties of momentary utility functions are present.
Assumption 2 allows households to choose consumption paths such that, asymptotically, the
consumption level is non-decreasing.
Assumption 2
∫
∞
0
e
−
∫
t
0
ρ(τ)dτ
dt <∞ for all i ∈ I.
All households are endowed with the same amount of time at each moment, supplied for
labor inelastically. The momentary time endowment is normalized to one, without leading
to loss of generality: if a household is larger and more than one members work, given that
labor supply is inelastic, personal labor incomes within the household can be summed up
and the household’s total labor income can be used instead.
For any given price vector (r (t) , w (t))
t≥0
>> 0, with r (t) being the interest rate and
w (t) the labor wage per unit of time at each moment, the budget constraint faced by
household i ∈ I is,
a˙
i
(t) = r (t) a
i
(t) + θ
i
(t)w (t)− c
i
(t) , (3)
for all t ≥ 0, (x˙ (t) ≡ dx (t) /dt for any variable x) and the transversality condition is,
lim
t→∞
e
−
∫
t
0
r(τ)dτ
a
i
(t) = 0 . (4)
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We deﬁne the domains of wealth- and productivity heterogeneity at any given price
vector, for which the existence of a representative consumer is conceptually relevant. That is
the domain that guarantees interiority of solutions to each individual optimization problem.
The following assumption states this formally.
Assumption 3 Given a community preference proﬁle captured by the collec-
tion of functions (u
i
)
i∈I
and ρ, the domain of, (i) initial distribution of assets
(a
i
0
)
i∈I
, (ii) the collection of labor-productivity functions
(
θ
i
)
i∈I
, and (iii) prices
(r (t) , w (t))
t≥0
, is restricted so that the optimization problems of all households
i ∈ I are well-deﬁned, and the solution to each individual problem is interior for
all t ≥ 0.
Given Assumption 3, maximizing (2) subject to the constraints (3) and (4) for any given
a
i
0
is an optimal-control problem with necessary optimality conditions given by,
c˙
i
(t) = −
u
i
1
(c
i
(t))
u
i
11
(c
i
(t))
[r (t)− ρ (t)] , (5)
together with (3) and (4), that lead to decision rules of the form,
c
i
(t) = C
i
(
a
i
(t) , t
∣∣∣
(
r (τ) , w (τ) , θ
i
(τ)
)
τ≥t
)
, (6)
i.e., consumption rules at each moment are memoryless, depending only on current personal
assets and current and future prices. Assumptions 1 and 3 have a particular connection,
that is revealed from equation (5). The term −
u
i
1
(c
i
(t))
u
i
11
(c
i
(t))
must always be well-deﬁned in order
to have interiority. Thus, to meet Assumption 3 (interior solutions), it is necessary that
c
i
(t) ∈ C
i
, for all t ≥ 0, and all i ∈ I.
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Deﬁnition 1 Given a community preference proﬁle captured by the collection of
functions (u
i
)
i∈I
, and ρ, complying with Assumptions 1 and 2, a representative
consumer (denoted by “RC”) is a (ﬁctitious) consumer who has time-separable
preferences,
∫
∞
0
v
RC
(c (t) , t) dt, with v
RC
1
(c, t) , v
RC
11
(c, t) and v
RC
12
(c, t) existing,
and with v
RC
1
(c, t) < ∞ and −∞ < v
RC
11
(c, t) , v
RC
12
(c, t) for all consumption
levels, c ∈ C
RC
≡
{
c ∈ R+
∣∣
c =
∫
I
c
i
dμ (i) , c
i
∈ C
i
, i ∈ I
}
, for all t ≥ 0, and
who possesses the economy-wide aggregate wealth and productivity at all times,
and whose demand functions coincide with the aggregate demand functions of the
economy at all times, namely,
c
RC
(t) = C
RC
(∫
I
a
i
(t) dμ (i) , t
∣∣∣∣∣
(
r (τ) , w (τ) ,
∫
I
θ
i
(τ) dμ (i)
)
τ≥t
)
=
=
∫
I
C
i
(
a
i
(t) , t
∣∣∣
(
r (τ) , w (τ) , θ
i
(τ)
)
τ≥t
)
dμ (i) , (7)
for all t ≥ 0, for the complete domain of prices (r (t) , w (t))
t≥0
, initial dis-
tributions of assets, (a
i
0
)
i∈I
, and functions
(
θ
i
: R+ → R
)
i∈I
that comply with
Assumption 3.
This is a rather strong representative-consumer concept: it focuses on solving only one
household’s problem using standard optimal-control techniques, in order to derive aggregate
demands at all times. Our goal is to examine conditions on the community preference
proﬁle that are necessary and suﬃcient for the existence of social preferences (representative-
consumer preferences) consistent with the independence axiom of Koopmans (S6): if two
diﬀerent intertemporal paths have a common outcome at a certain point in time, preferences
over these two paths should always, and solely, be determined by comparing them with
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remaining outcomes at that particular date that diﬀer. In other words, the focus of our
analysis is to characterize community preference proﬁles where social preferences are time-
separable and, at each separate point in time, non-intersecting social indiﬀerence curves
exist.
Assumption 4 ∩
i∈I
C
i
is non-empty and not a singleton.
Assumption 4 places a weak constraint on the scope of preference heterogeneity. It says
that nobody’s bliss point (if any), should be lower than or equal to anyone else’s subsistence
level of consumption (if any), hence ∩
i∈I
C
i
is an interval. Since the consumable good is
considered to be a composite good (a consumer basket), Assumption 4 is not unreasonably
restrictive.
7
The main result
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1 through 4, a representative consumer exists
if and only if
u
i
(c) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(αc+β
i
)
1−
1
α−1
α(1−
1
α
)
or
−e
−
1
β
i
c
with α > 0 and β
i
∈ R or α < 0 and β
i
∈ R++
with β
i
> 0
,
(8)
for all i ∈ I. The representative consumer has the common, across households,
rate of time preference, ρ (t), at all times, and momentary utility function given
by,
u
RC
(c) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(αc+β
RC
)
1−
1
α−1
α(1−
1
α
)
−e
−
1
β
RC
c
for α 	= 0
else
, (9)
with
β
RC
=
∫
I
β
i
dμ (i) .
The proof of Theorem 1 appears at the end of this supplementary information. Theorem 1
states comprehensively that the existence of a representative consumer rests upon particular
functional forms and common parameter values: the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
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α, should be the same across all households; households can diﬀer only with respect to their
subsistence consumption or bliss point of consumption; yet, it is either that all households
have some subsistence consumption, or that all households have some bliss point, but bliss
points and consumption subsistence levels cannot coexist in the same community preference
proﬁle.
These restrictions on the community preference proﬁle, (u
i
)
i∈I
, lead to common ori-
entation of incentives and actions of rich and poor, or large versus small, households. In
particular, the consumption decision rules of all household types, i ∈ I, are of the form,
c
i
(t) = b (t) a
i
(t) + ζ
i
(t) ,
i.e., they are always linear in ﬁnancial wealth, a
i
(t), and parallel across all households (see
the suﬃciency part in the proof of Theorem 1 below).
Introducing household-size heterogeneity and the necessity of the linear relationship across
EIs
Consider the unitary-model for households (S7), that individuals in multi-member house-
holds maximize a common objective function, a standard assumption in mainstream macro-
economics. Moreover, for simplicity, assume that ρ (t) = ρ for all t, another standard
assumption of the macroeconomic paradigm, and also that households of the same size all
have the same utility function. If a representative consumer exists, then utility functions
should fall in the class given by Theorem 1. Focusing on the case where r (t) = r¯ = ρ for all
t, and with w (t) = w¯, and θ
i
(t) =
¯
θ
i
for all t, a steady-state condition for all households,
(5) and (3) imply that
c
i
= r¯a
i
+ w¯
¯
θ
i
= y
i
, (10)
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where y
i
is the income of household i in the steady state. In our survey questionnaire,
asking respondents about monthly incomes refers to the above steady state conditions where
households consume their incomes. Substituting (10) for diﬀerent household types in the
utility functions given by Theorem 1,
u
i
(c) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ω
i
(αc+β
i
)
1−
1
α−1
α(1−
1
α
)
or
−ω
ie
−
1
β
i
c
with α > 0 and β
i
∈ R or α < 0 and β
i
∈ R++
with β
i
> 0
,
where ω
i is a weight depending on household size, in a steady-state equilibrium, setting
u
i
(y
i
) = u
j
(y
j
) for all i, j ∈ I, leads to
y
j
= χ
i,j
+ ψ
i,j
y
i
,
which is the linear relationship among EIs for all household types.
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Proof of Theorem 1
Part 1: Necessity
Fix any function ρ : R+ → R++, and any collection (u
i
)
i∈I
, with properties complying
with Assumptions 1, 2, and 4. Assume that a representative consumer exists with some
momentary utility function v
RC
: C
RC
×R+ → R, of the form v
RC
(c (t) , t), at each point in
time. Under Assumption 3, from Deﬁnition 1 and (5) it must be that,
v
RC
1
(∫
I
c
i
(t) dμ (i) , t
)
v
RC
11
(∫
I
c
i
(t) dμ (i) , t
)
[
r (t) +
v
RC
12
(∫
I
c
i
(t) dμ (i) , t
)
v
RC
1
(∫
I
c
i
(t) dμ (i) , t
)
]
=
∫
I
μ (i)
u
i
1
(c
i
(t))
u
i
11
(c
i
(t))
di [r (t)− ρ (t)] ,
(11)
where the term
−
v
RC
12
(∫
I
c
i
(t) dμ (i) , t
)
v
RC
1
(∫
I
c
i
(t) dμ (i) , t
)
is the temporal rate of time preference of the representative consumer.
(Necessity) Step 1: preliminary characterization of the function
∫
∞
0
v
RC
(c (t) , t) dt.
According to Deﬁnition 1, the existence (and the implied preference primitives) of the
representative consumer should be independent from any price regime. The case where
r (t) = ρ (t) for all t ≥ 0, should always be included in the price domain. To see this, ﬁx any
moment in time, t ∈ R+, pick any household i ∈ I, and multiply her budget constraint, (3),
by the integrating factor e
−
∫
τ
t
r(s)ds
, integrate over all τ ∈ [t,∞), and apply the transversality
condition, to obtain,
∫
∞
t
e
−
∫
τ
t
r(s)ds
c
i
(t) dτ = a
i
(t) +
∫
∞
t
e
−
∫
τ
t
r(s)ds
θ
i
(τ)w (τ) dτ . (12)
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For the case r (t) = ρ (t) for all t ≥ 0, under Assumption 3, (5) implies that c˙
i
(t) = 0 for all
t ∈ R+, and all i ∈ I, so, (12) implies that
c
i
(t) = cˆ
i
=
a
i
(t) +
∫
∞
t
e
−
∫
τ
t
ρ(s)ds
θ
i
(τ)w (τ) dτ∫
∞
t
e
−
∫
τ
t
ρ(s)ds
dτ
, for all t ≥ 0. (13)
For the given preference proﬁle, (u
i
)
i∈I
, (13) implies that there are always
(
a
i
0
, θ
i
)
i∈I
and
(w (t))
t≥0
securing that cˆ
i
∈ C
i
for all i ∈ I, and for all t ≥ 0. So, the case r (t) = ρ (t) for
all t ≥ 0, is always part of the domain complying with Assumption 3, for any (u
i
)
i∈I
that
satisﬁes Assumptions 1, 2, and 4.
Thus, set r (t) = ρ (t) for all t ≥ 0 and pick an appropriate
(
a
i
0
, θ
i
)
i∈I
and (w (t))
t≥0
securing that cˆ
i
> c
i
for all i ∈ I, and for all t ≥ 0, and also set,
c ≡
∫
I
cˆ
i
dμ (i) .
Equations (11) and (13) imply that the necessary optimality conditions of the representative
consumer are,
−
v
RC
12
(c, t)
v
RC
1
(c, t)
= ρ (t) .
So, standard Riemann integration with respect to t over the time interval [0, t] implies that,
v
RC
1
(c, t) = e
−
∫
t
0
ρ(τ)dτ
v
RC
1
(c, 0) ,
or,
v
RC
(c, t) = e
−
∫
t
0
ρ(τ)dτ
v
RC
(c, 0) ,
ignoring the constant, since this is a utility function. Setting,
u
RC
(c) ≡ v
RC
(c, 0) ,
we conclude that the objective of the representative consumer must be of the form,
U
RC
(
(c (t))
t≥0
)
=
∫
∞
0
e
−
∫
t
0
ρ(τ)dτ
u
RC
(c (t)) dt . (14)
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For notational ease, let f
RC
: C
RC
→ R++ and (f
i
: C
i
→ R++) i∈I , with
f
RC
(·) = −
v
RC
1
(·)
v
RC
11
(·)
and f
i
(·) = −
u
i
1
(·)
u
i
11
(·)
for all i ∈ I.
Combining (14) with (11), it is,
f
RC
(∫
I
c
i
(t) dμ (i)
)
=
∫
I
f
i
(
c
i
(t)
)
dμ (i) , (15)
for all (c
i
(t) ∈ C
i
)
i∈I
that are consumer-equilibrium choices and t ≥ 0.
(Necessity) Step 2: characterization of f
RC
: R+ → R++ and (f
i
: R+ → R++) i∈I . In this
step we show that,
(15)⇔
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
f
i
(c) = αc+ β
i
, and,
f
RC
(c) = αc+
∫
I
β
i
dμ (i) ,
for some α ∈ R and some β
i
∈ R, for all i ∈ I
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
. (16)
The suﬃciency part of (16) is straightforward. For the necessity part of (16), let (15)
hold, being the only information available concerning f
RC
: R+ → R++ and the collection
(f
i
: R+ → R++) i∈I . Suppose that r (t) = ρ (t) for all t ≥ 0, and, given (13), ﬁnd a common
distribution of
(
a
i
0
, θ
i
)
i∈I
and (w (t))
t≥0
, where a
i
0
= a0 and θ
i
= θ, so that c
i
(t) = c˜ for all
i ∈ I, and all t ≥ 0, also with c˜ ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
.
Let,
Φ
RC
(c) ≡ f
RC
(c)− f
RC
(c˜) , (17)
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and,
Φ
i
(c) ≡ f
i
(c)− f
i
(c˜) , for all i ∈ I . (18)
For this distribution, (15) implies that,
f
RC
(c˜) =
∫
I
f
i
(c˜) dμ (i) . (19)
Given (1), set μ such that,
0 < μ ≤ inf {dμ (i) | i ∈ I} . (20)
Pick any arbitrary household type i ∈ I, keep prices as before, and modify the previous
distribution by adding to μ of this household type diﬀerent wealth or productivity that
yields c
i
(t) = (c˜+∆c) ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
, for all t ≥ 0. Since prices are the same, c
j
(t) = c˜, for all
j ∈ I\{i} and for some households of type i with density dμ (i) − μ, and for all t ≥ 0.
Combining (15), (19), (17) and (18), it is,
Φ
RC
(
μ∆c+ c˜
)
= μΦ
i
(∆c+ c˜) . (21)
Since the choices of i ∈ I, ∆c, and c˜ ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
, were arbitrary, and since we can construct the
same distribution of consumption choices for all i ∈ I, (21) holds for all i ∈ I, so,
Φ
i
(c) = Φ (c) for all c ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
and for all i ∈ I. (22)
Given (13), we are able to construct any interior optimal path with distribution of consump-
tions with c
i
(t) = c ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
for all i ∈ I, and all t ≥ 0. Therefore, (15), (19), and (22)
imply that,
Φ
RC
(c) = Φ
i
(c) = Φ (c) for all c ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
and for all i ∈ I , (23)
and,
Φ
(∫
I
c
i
(t) dμ (i)
)
=
∫
I
Φ
(
c
i
(t)
)
dμ (i) , for all
(
c
i
(t) ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
)
i∈I
, and t ≥ 0 , (24)
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holding for the whole domain of wealth/labor-productivity heterogeneity and prices where
household choices fall in the interval ∩
i∈I
C
i
(see Assumption 4) and are interior. Equation
(24) enables us to further characterize Φ. In particular,
(24)⇔ Φ is aﬃne on ∩
i∈I
C
i
. (25)
The suﬃciency part of (25) is straightforward, so for the necessity part of (25) let’s set,
z
i
≡ c
i
− c˜ , (26)
with c˜ deﬁned as above for an arbitrary c˜ ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
, in the case where r (t) = ρ (t) for all t ≥ 0.
So, ﬁx c˜ and set,
Ψ(z) ≡ Φ(z)− Φ(0) , (27)
since we know that for the transformed variable, z, the choice of 0 falls in the class of interior
solutions to a distribution in the domain of (u
i
)
i∈I
, namely the case where all households
choose c˜ ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
at all times. We now show that Ψ is a linear functional. For any partition
of households, irrespective of their household types, say, I1,I2 ⊂ I, with I1 ∩ I2 = ∅,
and
∫
I
1
dμ (i) = μ, retaining r (t) = ρ (t) for all t ≥ 0, provide the same a0 and a labor-
productivity function θ to all i ∈ I1, so that consumption is equal to (∆c+ c˜) ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
for
all i ∈ I1 at all times, provide to the remaining households a˜0 and a labor-productivity
˜
θ,
so that their consumption is equal to c˜ ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
for all i ∈ I2 at all times. Then, z
i
= ∆c for
all i ∈ I1, and z
i
= 0 for all i ∈ I2, so,
Φ(μ∆c) = Φ (μ∆c+ (1− μ) 0) ,
and (24) and (27) imply that,
Φ(μ∆c) = μΦ(∆c) + (1− μ)Φ (0) ,
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or,
Ψ(μ∆c) = μΨ(∆c) . (28)
Notice that the choices of ∆c and μ were arbitrary. So, we can take any μ
1
, μ
2
∈ (0, 1) with
(μ
1
∆c+ c˜) , (μ
1
∆c+ c˜) ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
and
μ
2
μ
1
= ξ ∈ R+. Repeating the same steps, (28) yields
Ψ(μ
1
∆c) = μ
1
Ψ(∆c) and Ψ(ξμ
1
∆c) = ξμ
1
Ψ(∆c), or,
Ψ(ξμ
1
∆c) = ξΨ(μ
1
∆c) , for all ξ ∈ R+ . (29)
Since Ψ is a univariate function, (29) is suﬃcient to prove that Ψ is linear. So, let,
Ψ(z) = αz , α ∈ R,
and, due to the linearity of Ψ, the transformation (26) can be ignored, having (27) and (23)
implying that, Φ(c) = αc+Φ(0). But since (17) and (18) imply that Φ(c˜) = 0, Φ(0) = −αc˜.
So,
Φ
RC
(c) = Φ
i
(c) = Φ (c) = αc− αc˜ , α ∈ R, for all c ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
and for all i ∈ I . (30)
Using (30) we show that,
Φ
i
(c) = Φ (c) = αc− αc˜ , α ∈ R, for all c ∈ C
i
and for all i ∈ I . (31)
To prove (31), consider the case where an arbitrary c
j
∈ C
j
is such that c
j
≤ inf
(
∩
i∈I
C
i
)
or c
j
≥ sup
(
∩
i∈I
C
i
)
for some j ∈ I, whenever any of the two is possible (i.e. whenever
inf
(
∩
i∈I
C
i
)
> 0, or sup
(
∩
i∈I
C
i
)
< ∞). It is always that there exists some μ ∈ (0, 1),
with μ ≤ dμ (j), such that (μc
j
+ (1− μ) c˜) ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
. So, retaining r (t) = ρ (t) for all t ≥ 0,
provide a level a0 and a labor-productivity function θ to a mass μ of type j ∈ I, so that
consumption is equal to c
j
at all times, and also provide to the remaining households a˜0
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and a labor-productivity
˜
θ, so that their consumption is equal to c˜ ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
at all times.
Combining (15), (17), (18) and (19), it is,
μΦ
j
(
c
j
)
= Φ
RC
(
μc
j
+ (1− μ) c˜
)
.
But since (μc
j
+ (1− μ) c˜) ∈ ∩
i∈I
C
i
, (30) implies thatΦ
RC
(μc
j
+ (1− μ) c˜) = α (μc
j
+ (1− μ) c˜)−
αc˜, or
Φ
j
(
c
j
)
= αc
j
− αc˜ .
Since the choices of j ∈ I and c
j
∈ C
j
were arbitrary, (31) is proved.
Combining (18) with (31) it is,
f
i
(c) = αc− αc˜+ f
i
(c˜) for all c ∈ C
i
and all i ∈ I . (32)
Now that all f
i
’s are completely characterized over their domains, C
i
, we can consider the
case of c = 0, irrespective from whether 0 ∈ C
i
or not, in order to set the intercepts of all
f
i
’s. Equation (32) implies,
f
i
(c˜) = αc˜+ f
i
(0) . (33)
Setting f
i
(0) = β
i
for some β
i
∈ R, for all i ∈ I, a ﬁnal combination of (32) with (33), and
also setting β
RC
=
∫
I
β
i
dμ (i) (consistently with (15)), completes the proof of (16).
(Necessity) Step 3: characterization of (u
i
: R+ → R++) i∈I and u
RC
: R+ → R++.
In light of (16), we derive the functional forms of utility for all household types through
Riemann integration. There are two general cases, these of α 	= 0 and α = 0. (The case
where α = 1 is also of special interest, but the particular functional form of (u
i
)
i∈I
and u
RC
that result in this case, can be derived from the more general functional forms that apply to
α 	= 0.)
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For the case where α 	= 0, (16) implies that,
u
i
11
(c)
u
i
1
(c)
= −
1
αc+ β
i
,
and the indeﬁnite Riemann integral of this expression with respect to c yields,
ln
[
u
i
1
(c)
]
= −
1
α
ln (αc+ β
i
) + κi ,
where κi is some constant in R, that can be household-speciﬁc, and integrating once more,
it is,
u
i
(c) = e
κi
(αc+ β
i
)
1−
1
α
α
(
1−
1
α
) + κ ,
where κ is, again some constant. Setting e
κi
= 1, without loss of generality, and κ accord-
ingly, we obtain the result of (8). The special case where α = 1, is known to yield the result
that u
i
(c) = ln (αc+ β
i
)+κ, through computing the limit of the above expression for α→ 1
using L’Hôpital’s rule. The preferences of the representative consumer are derived in the
same way.
For the case where α = 0,
u
i
1
(c)
u
i
11
(c)
= −
1
β
i
,
and in order for u
i
1
> 0 and u
i
11
< 0 to hold, it must be that β
i
> 0. So,
ln
[
u
i
1
(c)
]
= −
1
β
i
c+ κi ,
and,
u
i
(c) = −
e
κi
β
i
e
−
1
β
i
c
+ κ ,
so, setting
e
κ
i
β
i
= 1 and κ = 0 yields the corresponding function in (8). With the same
reasoning for the representative consumer, the proof of the necessity part is complete.
18
Part 2: Suﬃciency
The particular functional forms given by (8) enable a complete analytical characterization
of the demand functions of all households at all times. Again, two cases must be examined
separately, this of α 	= 0 and the case where α = 0.
Under the assumption that α 	= 0, (5), implies,
c˙
i
(t) =
[
αc
i
(t) + β
i
]
[r (t)− ρ (t)] ,
so, multiplying this expression by the integrating factor e
−α
∫
τ
t
[r(s)−ρ(s)]ds
and integrating over
the interval [t, τ ] for any τ ∈ [t,∞), yields,
c
i
(τ) = c
i
(t) e
α
∫
τ
t
[r(s)−ρ(s)]ds
+ β
i
e
α
∫
τ
t
[r(s)−ρ(s)]ds
∫
τ
t
e
−α
∫
τ
t
[r(s)−ρ(s)]ds
[r (s)− ρ (s)] ds .
Multiplying this last expression by e
−
∫
τ
t
r(s)ds
, integrating over all τ ∈ [t,∞), and combining
the result with (12), gives,
c
i
(t) =
a
i
(t) +
∫
∞
t
e
−
∫
τ
t
r(s)ds
θ
i
(τ)w (τ) dτ∫
∞
t
e
∫
τ
t
[(α−1)r(s)−αρ(s)]ds
dτ
−
−
β
i
∫
∞
t
e
∫
τ
t
[(α−1)r(s)−αρ(s)]ds
∫
τ
t
e
−α
∫
τ
t
[r(s)−ρ(s)]ds
[r (s)− ρ (s)] dsdτ∫
∞
t
e
∫
τ
t
[(α−1)r(s)−αρ(s)]ds
dτ
, (34)
which can be linearly aggregated across all a
i
’s, θ
i
’s and β
i
’s, proving that a representative
consumer exists, as long as Assumption 1 holds, which keeps all individual demands taking
the form of (34).
For the case where α = 0, when all individual utilities fall in the class of u
i
(c) = −e
−
1
β
i
c
,
(34) implies that,
c
i
(t) =
a
i
(t) +
∫
∞
t
e
−
∫
τ
t
r(s)ds
θ
i
(τ)w (τ) dτ − β
i
∫
∞
t
e
−
∫
τ
t
r(s)ds
∫
τ
t
[r (s)− ρ (s)] dsdτ∫
∞
t
e
−
∫
τ
t
r(s)ds
dτ
, (35)
which can also be linearly aggregated across all a
i
’s, θ
i
’s and β
i
’s, completing the proof of
the theorem. Q.E.D.
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Part 2: Empirical Analysis
Objective. To obtain estimates of EIs from individual responses reﬂecting how intra-
household sharing of goods aﬀects individual material comfort, and to test the survey’s
eﬀectiveness.
Concept that captures household-size economies, central in regression analysis: equiva-
lence scale (ES). Dividing the EI of a household type by the reference income (RI) gives
this household’s ES. Given that the ES of the one-member household is equal to one, ESs
directly inform us about the percentage change in household income required to maintain
the household’s material comfort as household members are added. If adding a person to a
household requires an increase in income which is less than 100% of the corresponding RI in
order to keep material comfort constant, then there are household-size economies. So, the
higher the household-size economies, the lower the corresponding ES for a household.
Description of the Survey Method, Sampling Strategy, and Plan of Analysis
A detailed description of the survey instrument appears in the section “Survey Instrument
Documentation” at the end of this Supporting Material.
Main Evaluation Task (MET). Part A of the questionnaire formulates the MET. It is
necessary to examine demographic and descriptive income statistics from the country being
studied in order to determine appropriate household types and reference incomes (RIs) to
use in Part A. In Germany, the eight household types that were chosen represent 86.05% of
the overall number of households, as seen in Table S1, based on the most recent German
Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS) of 2003 (S8). The EVS, provided by the German
Statistical Oﬃce in ﬁve-year intervals, contains representative household-level information
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on income, wealth, and expenditures for several types of goods. The RIs provided in Part
A were determined so as to cover a broad range of the disposable-income distribution for
single-childless-adult households in Germany. The amount of EUR 500 per month is the
level of total social assistance for a one-member household in Germany. Speciﬁcally, the
level of monetary social assistance in 2006 for a single, childless adult is EUR 345 per month
(see Article 20, Paragraph 2, 2a, 3, Sozialgesetzbuch II (SGB II - “Social Security Code”)
(S9)). In addition, households receive housing allowances. The level of housing allowances is
contingent upon the rent and also upon the income and wealth of the single, childless adult.
A reasonable number is ca. EUR 160. The amount of EUR 1,250 corresponds to the 41st
percentile of the one-member-household monthly disposable-income distribution, EUR 2,000
to the 76th, EUR 2,750 to the 89th, and EUR 3,500 to the 94th percentile. Each respondent
was provided with only one RI to evaluate in Part A (by random assignment).
Limited Information Bias (LIB) and Sampling Strategy. In order to enable tests of LIB
that have suﬃcient statistical power, the sampling strategy should ensure that there are
enough respondents who live in each of the household types that appear as hypothetical
households in Part A. Since the RIs chosen in Part A cover a wide range of one-member-
household disposable incomes, sampling should be such that, for each household type, the
respondents’ household income represents a wide range of the economy’s household incomes.
Let respondent i belong to household type h and let Y
i be the disposable household income
of respondent i. From responses to Part A, we calculate ﬁve average EIs for household type
h, each corresponding to an RI. We identify the average EI for household type h that is
closest to Y
i. This identiﬁed average EI corresponds to an RI that should give the same level
of material comfort for the one-member household. If this particular RI coincides with the
RI that was randomly assigned to i in Part A, then i performed the MET for hypothetical
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households with material comforts close to his/her own. We use this identiﬁcation procedure
to create the dummy variables,
LIBmc,i = 1 if respondent i’s material comfort is closest to the material comfort
of the one-member household, based on the RI that respondent i evaluated in
Part A; 0 otherwise; and
LIB
h,i = 1 if respondent i belongs to household type h, and the dependent
variable in the regression refers to household type h; 0 otherwise.
Variables LIBh,i, LIBmc,i, and the product LIBh,i · LIBmc,i, serve as conditioning vari-
ables in the regression analysis of the stated EIs from Part A, and test for LIB.
Normalized Likert-scale Evaluation (NLSE). Part B of the questionnaire asks for Likert-
scale evaluations of material comfort. The value corresponding to the NLSE of respondent
i for a household type h is given by,
NLSE
h
i
= ln
(
L
h
i
L
∗
i
)
where L
h
i
denotes respondent i’s stated Likert-scale value for household type h, and L
∗
i
de-
notes the Likert-scale value given by the same respondent, i, for the one-member household.
The NLSE is eﬀective in suppressing noise from Heterogeneity in Respondent Perceptions of
Verbal Characterizations (HRPVC — see the Results of this section of the Supporting mater-
ial). Each respondent was provided with only one RI to evaluate in Part B, again randomly
assigned. The RIs in Part A are assigned independently from those assigned in Part B. This
feature of the survey design helps to avoid the possibility that the NLSE is spuriously corre-
lated with the dependent variable in the regression analysis appearing in Table 1 in the text.
Spurious correlation may result from having the same respondent focusing on the same level
of material comfort in the evaluations of Parts A and B: some respondents may consciously
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attempt to provide consistent responses between Parts A and B, instead of focusing on the
evaluation question in each Part.
Regression Analysis. Our regression model is,
ES
h
i
= f
h
(RIi) + b
h
0
RI Dummiesi + b
h
1
NLSE
h
i
+ b
h
2
LIBh,i + b
h
3
LIBmc,i
+b
h
4
(LIBh,i · LIBmc,i) + b
h
5
Personal Characteristicsi + ε
h
i
(36)
The dependent variable is deﬁned as,
ES
h
i
=
EI
h
i
RIi
where EI
h
i
is the EI stated by respondent i about household type h, given that respondent i
was asked to state EIs using a one-member household with RI equal to RIi as a benchmark.
Because an EI divided by RI is an ES, ES
h
i
is i’s assessment of the ES concerning household
type h, given the RI level that was assigned to i in Part A of the questionnaire.
The function f
h
(RIi) in equation (36) is a proposed candidate for oﬀering an accu-
rate explanation of the relationship between RIs and ESs. The term ε
h
i
is the error term.
Deﬁnitions and roles of all conditioning variables in equation (1) are:
RI Dummiesi. This is a set that can include up to four dummy variables related
to RIi, the RI assigned to respondent i in Part A. If, for example, the RI equal
to EUR 2,000 is included in this set, then the RI Dummy(=EUR 2,000) takes
the value of 1 for all respondents who where assigned RI equal to 2,000 EUR,
and 0 otherwise. If the function f
h
(RI) in equation (36) is f
h
(RI) = a
h
, where
a
h
is a constant number, then RI Dummiesi can contain up to four RI dummy
variables. If f
h
(RI) is of the form f
h
(RI) = a
h
+g
h
(RI), where a
h
is a constant
and g
h
(RI) is a monotonic function of RI, then RI Dummiesi can contain up to
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three RI dummy variables, since four RI dummy variables together with a con-
stant are perfectly correlated with g
h
(RI). The conditioning set RI Dummiesi
is the instrument for conducting the speciﬁcation test for any candidate function
f
h
(RI): if there is any variation in that is left unexplained by f
h
(RI) in regres-
sion (36), then it should be captured by RI Dummiesi; so a test of exclusion of
RI Dummiesi reveals whether f
h
(RI) satisfactorily captures the dependence of
ESs on RI. If the function f
h
(RI) = a
h
passes the speciﬁcation test, then the hy-
pothesis that ESs depend on RI is rejected. Independence of ESs from RI, called
“Independence of Base” (S10), or “Equivalence Scale Exactness,” (S11), has been
a working hypothesis serving the econometric identiﬁcation of consumer demand
systems that use consumption data from diﬀerent household types. Later studies
on econometric demand systems relax this hypothesis (S12-13).
NLSE
h
i
. If the sign of b
h
1
in regression (36) is negative, then a necessary condi-
tion behind the hypothesis that respondents understand the MET ﬁnds aﬃrming
evidence. Moreover, the estimator of b
h
1
may control for some respondents’ de-
viant opinions about, e.g., the cost of partners or children, so a test of exclusion
of the NLSE in the regression provides information about the possible presence
of such deviant evaluations.
LIBh,i, LIBmc,i, (LIBh,i · LIBmc,i). A coeﬃcient t-student test and a test of
exclusion of each of these three variables test LIB. If none of b
h
2
, b
h
3
, and b
h
4
, is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, then LIB does not prevent respondents from
eﬀectively performing the MET for hypothetical households.
Personal Characteristicsi. This is a set of conditioning variables referring to
personal characteristics of the respondents. A coeﬃcient t-student test and a
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test of exclusion of each of these variables indicate whether any characteristics
of the respondents aﬀect their assessments of EI.
Research sample and results
Research Sample
The survey’s sample consists of 2,042 respondents from all regions of Germany, collected
by the research institute “FORSA” (“Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistische Analy-
sen mbH” - Research Institute for Social Research and Statistical Analyses), in 2006. The
FORSA institute routinely conducts surveys with a representative online panel of about
10,000 German households. FORSA has stored an extensive set of socio-economic and
demographic variables for each participating household. This enables a pre-screening of re-
spondents’ personal and household characteristics. Households were provided with web TVs
when internet was not available. Completion times ranged from about 10 to 25 minutes.
The sampling procedure is targeted to obtain enough respondents who live in each of
the household types that appear as hypothetical households in Part A. Table S2 shows the
number of respondents from each family type. Table S2 also compares the percentages of
respondents from each household type in the sample with the percentages of household types
in the overall German population. This comparison reveals that pre-screening of respondent
characteristics is eﬃcient. The household type consisting of 1 adult with 3 children has been
more than six times over-represented in the sample compared to the German population.
Even so, there were only 19 respondents from households with 1 adult and 3 children. For the
other seven household types, respondent numbers are suﬃciently high to conduct the LIB
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test concerning how the household type that a respondent belongs to may aﬀect assessments
of EI: the role of in regressions should be reliable.
Table S3 shows the household-type distribution of respondents who are included in the
LIBmc,i dummy variable. This is a total of 415 respondents, the sum of the entries in the
ﬁrst column of Table S3. Each entry in the ﬁrst column of Table S3 shows the number of
respondents in the (LIBh,i · LIBmc,i) dummy variable for each household type. Apart from
single-adult households with two or three children, LIB tests based on the (LIBh,i · LIBmc,i)
dummy variable have suﬃcient statistical power.
Table S4 presents an outline of the socio-economic and demographic attributes of the
respondents. The sample encompasses a broad variety of characteristics within each of these
attributes. The intended over-representation of respondents having children has contributed
considerably to the high percentage of female respondents.
Results
Heterogeneity in Respondent Perceptions of Verbal Characterizations (HRPVC). Table
S5 presents the descriptive statistics of Likert-scale values stated in Part B for all household
types and RIs. The means and medians across household types for a given reference income
are close to each other. This lends support to the results of the pilot survey that was run
in advance to deﬁne the EIs that were provided in Part B (S14): respondents of the present
survey also perceive the average incomes stated by the respondents of the pilot survey as
EIs.
Figure S1 depicts information from the ﬁrst column of Table S5, which refers to the
one-member household. Each box in Figure S1 is deﬁned by the value of the ﬁrst and third
quartile, so each box contains 50% of the values around the median. A dash within a box
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represents the median response, while each vertical line spans the range of responses. Except
for RI = EUR 2,750, the range of responses covers the whole Likert-scale interval that was
provided (from 1 to 100). In particular, for the distribution of responses corresponding
to RI = EUR 1,250, both the mean and the median lie in the middle of the range, and
the two middle quartiles are distanced symmetrically from the median by 20 points in the
Likert scale. So, while Figure S1 shows that there is positive correlation between income and
subjective perceptions of living standards, the noisiness of the Likert-scale values indicates
the presence of HRPVC. Such noisiness justiﬁes concerns about the eﬀectiveness of using
‘raw’ Likert-scale values for interpersonal comparisons and about their role as conditioning
variables in regressions (S15-17).
The descriptive statistics of NLSE are given by Table S6 and Figures S2 to S6. By the
deﬁnition of NLSE, noise stemming from HRPVC should be suppressed. Table S6 conﬁrms
this suppressive eﬀect of the NLSE.
Regressions and associated tests. In Tables S7 and S8 we report regression results pre-
sented in Table 1 in the text in more detail.
Motivated by Figure 1 in the text, the functional form in equation (36) that was tested
for speciﬁcation eﬀectiveness is,
f
h
(RI) = a
h
+
b
h
RI
. (37)
Equation (37) has been suggested as a means of demand-system and ﬁxed-cost identiﬁcation.
The properties of equation (37) have been named “Generalized Absolute Equivalence Scale
Exactness (GAESE)” (S13). Yet, GAESE cannot be tested a priori based on a demand-
system analysis only. Employing the functional form given by equation (37) for f
h
(RI),
ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions can be used. The OLS results can be summarized
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as follows:
RI Dummiesi, speciﬁcation test of (37). Since the functional form given by
(37) includes a constant and a monotonic function of RI, no more than three
dummy variables were used. None of the results concerning speciﬁcation tests of
(37) is sensitive to the selection of RIs for this set of three RI dummy variables.
The RI dummy variable at RI = EUR 2,750 is always signiﬁcant, yet has only a
small inﬂuence on the estimates of ES. The exclusion tests concerning all three RI
dummy variables have moderately low F-test statistics. None of these tests rejects
exclusion with a conﬁdence level of 99% or more. In sum, equation (37) gives a
reasonable speciﬁcation for f
h
(RI), which has meaningful intuition. Coeﬃcient
b
h
in (37) can be interpreted as ﬁxed costs in consumption, in addition to the ﬁxed
costs of the one-member household. The constant a
h
in equation (37) is a measure
of household-size economies after controlling for the presence of household-type
speciﬁc ﬁxed costs in consumption. As household income increases, ﬁxed costs
become a smaller share of a household’s budget. In other words, ES is a decreasing
function of RI.
NLSE
h
i
. All NLSE coeﬃcients have a negative sign and all tests of exclusion
are rejected (P<0.001). These ﬁndings support the eﬀectiveness of the survey
method. Moreover, the size of all NLSE coeﬃcients is small, indicating that
respondents’ deviant opinions about household-size economies do not aﬀect the
estimators of coeﬃcients and in equation (37) to a large extent.
LIB
h,i, LIBmc,i, (LIBh,i · LIBmc,i). Only two out of 21 dummy variables related
to testing LIB are signiﬁcant, but with small coeﬃcients. Only one exclusion test
is rejected (P<0.01) — for the household type with 2 adults and 1 child. These
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ﬁndings oﬀer supporting evidence that respondents’ own household type and/or
level of material comfort do not bias their assessments of EIs in Part A.
Personal Characteristicsi. With two exceptions, Table S8 shows that respon-
dents’ personal characteristics do not appear statistically signiﬁcant in the regres-
sions. Respondents living in the New Laender report slightly higher ESs. More
educated respondents also state slightly higher ESs for hypothetical household
types with children. All the coeﬃcients are small.
Explanatory power of the regressions. The regressions ﬁt the data quite well;
they explain 30-54% of the total variation of stated ESs. Small standard errors
for coeﬃcients a
h
and b
h
in equation (37) indicate a broad consensus across
respondents concerning the MET.
Pilot Studies
The breakdown of the samples in pilot studies appears in Tables S9a and S9b. Table
S10 summarizes the Seemingly Unrelated-Regressions (SUR) and the tests for a linear re-
lationship between EI and RI using data from pilot studies (S14, S18), and which appear
in Figures 2 and 3 in the text. The complete questionnaire appears in Appendix A.1 of a
previous study (S14).
In Botswana the questionnaire consisted of questions about three reference incomes in-
stead of ﬁve. Because several languages (mainly Setswana and Kalanga, but also Sekgala-
gadi) are used in Botswana, interviewers had to resort to oral interviews. The response rate
with ﬁve reference incomes was low and given our planned budget and time constraints we
modiﬁed the questionnaire so as to increase the response rate. For the purpose of testing
the income dependence of equivalence scales three reference incomes serve this task well.
For testing the linear relationship between EIs and RIs, three reference incomes are mar-
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ginally suﬃcient for such a test. Nevertheless, we include this country in this study as
complementary information.
Sampling of pilot studies
The questionnaire, the sampling strategy and sampling regions for Germany, France, and
Cyprus appear in previous studies (S14, S18). The sampling region in China was the urban
area of Hangzhou and several towns in the province of Zhejiang. In India the sample was
collected from cities and villages of three states of south India, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh,
and Karnataka. The cities where our respondents were surveyed are Chennai (Madras) in
Tamil Nadu, Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh), and Bangalore in Karnataka. The question-
naire was provided in the languages of Tamil (Tamil Nadu), Telegu (Andhra Pradesh), in
the English language (respondents from Karnataka preferred English instead of our question-
naires provided in the language Kannada) and elderly respondents were given the option of
a questionnaire in Hindi. In Botswana sampling was from the capital Gaborone and villages
around it. Apart from questionnaires provided in English, a large part of the respondents
were interviewed orally, mainly in the languages Setswana and Kalanga. Sample surveys
typically lasted between 20-35 minutes, as respondents had to evaluate 5 diﬀerent RIs.
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Table S1.  Distribution of household types in Germany. Data refer to the overall population and are 
taken from the German Income and Expenditure Survey in 2003. 
Household type 
1 adult,  
0
children 
1 adult,  
1
child
1 adult,  
2
children 
1 adult,  
3
children
2 adults,  
0
children 
2 adults,  
1
 child 
2 adults,  
2
children 
2 adults,  
3
children 
Other 
Number of 
households
(in 
thousands) 
14,031.1 931.4 356.3 45.4 11,208.4 2,440.9 2,963.2 808.3 5,312.8 
% of 
population  36.83 2.44 0.94 0.12 29.42 6.41 7.78 2.12 13.95 
Table S2.  Distribution of household types of respondents in the survey sample (first two rows). The 
last row refers to the overall German population, using data from the most recent German Income and 
Expenditure Survey in 2003. Numbers appearing in the third row are percentages of the sum of 
households belonging to the eight household types presented in this table. 
Household type 
1 adult,  
0 children 
1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Number of respondents 445 125 57 19 415 396 434 151 
% of respondents 21.79 6.12 2.79 0.93 20.32 19.39 21.25 7.39 
% of population in 2003 42.80 2.84 1.09 0.14 34.19 7.45 9.04 2.47 
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Table S3. Distribution of respondents having an adjusted disposable household income that is similar 
to the reference income they were asked to evaluate in Part A of the questionnaire. The adjusted 
disposable household income is the disposable household income divided by the estimated 
equivalence scale for the respondent’s household type. The estimated equivalence scale is the 
average equivalence scale from responses to Part A. 
Respondent’s 
household type 
Number of 
respondents 
Percentage of overall 
sample 
Percentage of all 
respondents who belong to 
the same household type 
1 adult, 0 children 88 4.31 19.78 
1 adult, 1 child 26 1.27 20.80 
1 adult, 2 children 15 0.73 26.32 
1 adult, 3 children 5 0.24 26.32 
2 adults, no children 77 3.78 18.55 
2 adults, 1 child 77 3.78 19.44 
2 adults, 2 children 93 4.55 21.43 
2 adults, 3 children 34 1.67 22.52 
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Table S4. Description of the personal characteristics of the 2,042 respondents in the survey.  
a
 Respondents who have completed schooling sufficient for general qualification for entrance to a 
German University; b Respondents who stated that they have an occupation, and they either did not 
state their occupation type, or their occupation type did not fit in the other working categories;  
c Respondents who stated that they are non-working, and they either did not state their status, or their 
status did not fit in the other categories. 
Number of 
respondents 
% of 
respondents 
Former West Germany 1,541 75.5 Region 
Former East Germany 501 24.5 
Male 465 22.8 Gender 
Female 1,577 77.2 
No degree 42 2.1 
Basic level of schooling  (9 years) 587 28.7 
Secondary School 926 45.3 
Advanced technical college 119 5.8 
High School a 163 8.0 
Education 
Completed technical school or university 205 10.0 
Self employed 43 2.1 
Civil servant 57 2.8 
White collar 583 28.6 
Blue collar 180 8.8 
Pupil, student, trainee 23 1.1 
Occupational Status 
Working, otherb 52 2.5 
Pensioner 327 16.0 
Unemployed 152 7.4 
Housewife/man 452 22.1 
Obligatory military / public service 101 4.9 
Status of non-working 
Non-working, otherc 72 3.5 
Less than 500 EUR 36 1.8 
Between 500 and 1000 Euros 239 11.7 
Between 1,000 and 1,500 Euros 385 18.9 
Between 1,500 and 2,000 Euros 437 21.4 
Between 2,000 and 2500 Euros 382 18.7 
Between 2,500 and 3,000 Euros 242 11.9 
Between 3,000 and 3,500 Euros 159 7.8 
Between 3,500 and 4,000 Euros 68 3.3 
Between 4,000 and 4,500 Euros 44 2.2 
Family after-tax income 
class 
4,500 Euros or more 50 2.4 
Between 18 and 40 years 863 42.3 
Between 40 and 60 years 831 40.7 
Age group 
60 years or older 348 17.0 
Yes 1,396 68.4 Partner in the household 
No 646 31.6 
0 860 42.1 
1 521 25.5 
2 491 24.0 
Number of children in the 
household 
3 or more 170 8.3 
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Table S5. Descriptive statistics of stated Likert-scale values. Number of respondents for each 
reference income: 428 (500 Euros); 422 (1,250 Euros); 385 (2,000 Euros); 402 (2,750 Euros); 405 
(3,500 Euros). 
Household type Reference 
income 1 adult,  
0 children 
1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Mean 17.60 20.03 22.58 23.43 24.37 24.43 24.96 27.38 
Median 10 10 15 15 20 20 20 20 
Std 19.77 19.76 19.87 20.37 21.14 20.98 21.54 23.18 
StdError 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.98 1.02 1.01 1.04 1.12 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
First Quartile 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
500  
Euros 
Third Quartile 20 30 30 30 36 30 35 40 
Mean 51.24 48.81 49.62 49.81 56.92 56.89 57.31 55.85 
Median 50 50 50 50 52.5 55 60 55 
Std 25.19 23.74 22.83 23.24 22.72 21.85 22.58 24.17 
StdError 1.23 1.16 1.11 1.13 1.11 1.06 1.10 1.18 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
First Quartile 30 30 30 30 40 40 40 40 
1,250 
Euros 
Third Quartile 70 68.75 68.75 70 70 70 70 70 
Mean 73.76 68.42 66.99 63.37 77.18 75.73 74.70 72.70 
Median 80 70 70 65 80 80 80 75 
Std 23.74 22.77 22.47 23.14 19.84 19.35 19.98 22.31 
StdError 1.21 1.16 1.15 1.18 1.01 0.99 1.02 1.14 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
First Quartile 60 50 50 50 69 65 60 60 
2,000 
Euros 
Third Quartile 90 90 85 80 90 90 90 90 
Mean 87.60 85.28 81.72 78.66 89.03 87.67 86.13 83.59 
Median 95 90 85 80 92.5 90 90 90 
Std 17.75 16.95 18.00 19.95 14.58 14.64 15.92 18.81 
StdError 0.89 0.85 0.90 0.99 0.73 0.73 0.79 0.94 
Min 10 15 20 10 20 40 30 15 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
First Quartile 80 80 70 70 80 80 80 70 
2,750 
Euros 
Third Quartile 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Mean 91.63 88.59 87.28 84.42 93.59 92.28 89.99 87.28 
Median 100 100 90 90 100 100 100 100 
Std 16.27 17.23 17.00 18.53 12.26 14.07 15.84 19.14 
StdError 0.81 0.86 0.84 0.92 0.61 0.70 0.79 0.95 
Min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Max 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
First Quartile 90 80 80 75 90 90 87 80 
3,500 
Euros 
Third Quartile 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table S6.  Descriptive statistics of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations.  
Household type 
Reference 
income 1 adult,  1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Mean 0.23 0.41 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.61 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.20 0.12 0.29 
Std 0.62 0.83 0.92 0.87 0.90 1.03 1.06 
StdError 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
Min -1.79 -1.79 -2.08 -1.20 -1.79 -3.91 -2.30 
Max 3.00 3.91 4.09 3.91 3.91 4.09 4.25 
First Quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
500 
Euros 
Third Quartile 0.41 0.69 0.84 0.69 0.69 1.10 1.10 
Mean -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.12 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std 0.38 0.48 0.58 0.48 0.53 0.59 0.72 
StdError 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Min -1.61 -2.20 -2.64 -1.61 -2.20 -2.20 -4.50 
Max 2.30 3.00 3.40 3.69 3.40 3.91 4.09 
First Quartile -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 0.00 -0.11 -0.15 -0.18 
1,250 
Euros 
Third Quartile 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.34 
Mean -0.06 -0.09 -0.17 0.08 0.07 0.05 -0.01 
Median 0.00 -0.05 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std 0.26 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.58 
StdError 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Min -1.95 -1.95 -4.25 -2.20 -2.20 -2.20 -4.38 
Max 1.39 1.61 1.95 2.08 2.14 2.20 2.30 
First Quartile -0.15 -0.22 -0.34 -0.05 -0.11 -0.13 -0.21 
2,000 
Euros 
Third Quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Mean -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.05 
Median 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std 0.14 0.21 0.31 0.26 0.28 0.32 0.38 
StdError 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Min -0.59 -0.85 -2.20 -0.92 -0.81 -1.10 -1.25 
Max 1.10 1.39 1.39 1.95 2.08 2.20 2.30 
First Quartile -0.06 -0.15 -0.22 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 -0.17 
2,750 
Euros 
Third Quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mean -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.19 0.23 0.36 
StdError 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Min -2.30 -0.92 -1.50 -0.69 -0.92 -1.32 -4.32 
Max 1.39 1.39 1.61 4.09 1.39 1.39 1.39 
First Quartile -0.05 -0.11 -0.16 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.11 
3,500 
Euros 
Third Quartile 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table S7. Summary of ordinary least squares regressions. Endogenous variable: equivalence scales 
stated by respondents. Number of observations: 2,042. Standard Errors in parentheses. P-values of F-
tests in brackets. *** P<0.001, ** P<0.01, * P<0.05. 
 Household type 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Constant 1.06*** (0.03) 
1.12*** 
(0.05) 
1.20*** 
(0.08) 
1.42*** 
(0.06) 
1.44*** 
(0.07) 
1.53*** 
(0.09) 
1.61*** 
(0.11) 
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
269.74*** 
(9.77) 
498.34*** 
(16.28) 
728.85*** 
(23.45) 
329.38*** 
(15.91) 
592.99*** 
(20.81) 
839.25*** 
(27.41) 
1,079.86*** 
(34.34) 
Dummy reference 
income 1,250 Euros 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
Dummy reference 
income 2,000 Euros 
0.02 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
Dummy reference 
income 2,750 Euros 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
-0.07** 
(0.02) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.08** 
(0.02) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.13*** 
(0.04) 
Normalized Likert 
scale evaluation 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.10*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.13*** 
(0.02) 
Dummy for same 
household type of 
respondent 
0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.14* 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
Dummy for same 
material comfort of 
respondent 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
Dummy for same 
household type and 
material comfort of 
respondent 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.16* 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.14) 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.53 0.54 0.30 0.46 0.52 0.54 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
2.36 
[0.07] 
3.07* 
[0.03] 
3.29* 
[0.02] 
3.60* 
[0.01] 
3.37* 
[0.02] 
3.45* 
[0.02] 
3.51* 
[0.01] 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of the 
normalized Likert 
scale evaluation 
14.79*** 
[0.00] 
30.79*** 
[0.00] 
37.72*** 
[0.00] 
14.37*** 
[0.00] 
18.90*** 
[0.00] 
24.76*** 
[0.00] 
43.96*** 
[0.00] 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of dummy 
for same household 
type 
2.98 
[0.08] 
0.05 
[0.82] 
1.28 
[0.26] 
0.35 
[0.55] 
0.66 
[0.42] 
0.02 
[0.88] 
0.03 
[0.87] 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of dummy 
for same material 
comfort 
0.31 
[0.58] 
3.06 
[0.08] 
1.79 
[0.18] 
3.09 
[0.08] 
0.30 
[0.85] 
0.96 
[0.33] 
1.28 
[0.26] 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of dummy 
for same household 
type and material 
comfort 
1.96 
[0.16] 
1.96 
[0.16] 
0.01 
[0.91] 
1.21 
[0.27] 
7.56** 
[0.01] 
0.09 
[0.77] 
0.11 
[0.74] 
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Table S8. Summary of ordinary least squares coefficients and F-tests for exclusion referring to 
personal characteristics of respondents. Endogenous variable: equivalence scales stated by 
respondents. Number of observations: 2,042. Standard Errors of coefficients in parentheses. P-values 
of F-tests in brackets. Boldface characters for coefficients that have P-values below 5%.  
*** P<0.001, ** P<0.01, * P<0.05. 
Variable 
Values 
1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
0.02 (0.01) 0.04* (0.02) 0.05* (0.02)Region 1: Former East Germany 
0: Former West Germany F=3.11 [0.08] F=4.47 [0.03] F=4.81 [0.03] 
-0.01 (0.01) -0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02)Gender 1: female  
0: male F=0.55 [0.46] F=0.01 [0.92] F=0.00 [0.96] 
0.01*** (0.00) 0.02*** (0.01) 0.03*** (0.01)Education 1: no degree 
... 
6: compl. tech. school/university F=13.57 [0.00] F=14.26 [0.00] F=16.89 [0.00] 
-0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.04) -0.02 (0.07)Self employed 1: yes 
0: no F=0.02 [0.90] F=0.00 [0.98] F=0.07 [0.80] 
0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06)Civil servant 1: yes 
0: no F=0.26 [0.61] F=0.08 [0.78] F=0.03 [0.87] 
-0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04)Blue collar 1: yes 
0: no F=0.13 [0.72] F=0.53 [0.47] F=0.85 [0.36] 
0.02 (0.05) 0.06 (0.08) 0.07 (0.11)Pupil, student, trainee 1: yes 
0: no F=0.20 [0.65] F=0.75 [0.39] F=0.50 [0.48] 
0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.05) 0.05 (0.08)Working, other 1: yes 
0: no F=0.01 [0.92] F=0.11 [0.75] F=0.57 [0.45] 
0.00 (0.02) -0.00 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03)Pensioner 1: yes 
0: no F=0.08 [0.78] F=0.01 [0.92] F=0.04 [0.85] 
0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04)Unemployed 1: yes 
0: no F=0.22 [0.64] F=0.01 [0.93] F=0.29 [0.59] 
-0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03)Housewife/man 1: yes 
0: no F=0.85 [0.36] F=1.17 [0.28] F=1.00 [0.32] 
0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.04) 0.02 (0.06)Obligatory military /  
public service 
1: yes 
0: no F=1.93 [0.17] F=0.67 [0.41] F=0.10 [0.75] 
0.03 (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) 0.03 (0.06)Non-working, other 1: yes 
0: no F=1.88 [0.17] F=1.18 [0.28] F=0.38 [0.54] 
0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03)Number of adults in the  
respondent’s household 1: one adult 2: two adults  F=0.08 [0.78] F=0.08 [0.78] F=0.60 [0.44] 
0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)Number of children in the 
respondent’s household 
0: no children 
…
3: three or more children  F=1.10 [0.30] F=2.61 [0.11] F=3.67 [0.06] 
0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01)Family after-tax income 1: lowest income class 
…
10: highest income class F=0.06 [0.81] F=0.04 [0.84] F=0.01 [0.93] 
-0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00)Age 
Age of respondent in years 
F=0.53 [0.47] F=0.08 [0.77] F=0.04 [0.85] 
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Table S8 (continued).
Variable 
Values 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
0.04* (0.02) 0.06* (0.02) 0.08** (0.03) 0.10** (0.04) Region 1: Former East Germany 
0: Former West Germany F=5.33 [0.02] F=6.42 [0.01] F=8.40 [0.00] F=7.34 [0.01] 
-0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04) Gender 1: female  
0: male F=0.55 [0.46] F=0.21 [0.64] F=0.11 [0.74] F=0.05 [0.83] 
0.01 (0.01) 0.02** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) 0.03** (0.01) Education 1: no degree 
….
6: compl. tech. School  
or university 
F=2.54 [0.11] F=7.52 [0.01] F=6.88 [0.01] F=7.54 [0.01] 
0.05 (0.05) 0.04 (0.08) 0.00 (0.10) -0.03 (0.12) Self employed 1: yes 
0: no F=0.85 [0.36] F=0.31 [0.58] F=0.00 [0.97] F=0.07 [0.80] 
-0.02 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06) 0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.09) Civil servant 1: yes 
0: no F=0.11 [0.74] F=0.06 [0.81] F=0.00 [0.98] F=0.00 [0.96] 
-0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.04) -0.05 (0.05) -0.08 (0.06) Blue collar 1: yes 
0: no F=0.06 [0.80] F=0.11 [0.74] F=0.99 [0.32] F=1.73 [0.19] 
-0.03 (0.08) 0.06 (0.13) 0.12 (0.15) 0.12 (0.16) Pupil, student, trainee 1: yes 
0: no F=0.13 [0.72] F=0.38 [0.54] F=1.04 [0.31] F=0.71 [0.40] 
0.04 (0.05) 0.06 (0.07) 0.08 (0.10) 0.11 (0.12) Working, other 1: yes 
0: no F=0.56 [0.45] F=1.03 [0.31] F=1.17 [0.28] F=1.38 [0.24] 
0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) -0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.05) Pensioner 1: yes 
0: no F=0.05 [0.82] F=0.08 [0.78] F=0.18 [0.67] F=0.01 [0.92] 
-0.05 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) -0.07 (0.05) -0.06 (0.07) Unemployed 1: yes 
0: no F=2.77 [0.10] F=1.21 [0.27] F=1.86 [0.17] F=1.02 [0.31] 
-0.03 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) -0.05 (0.04) -0.06 (0.04) Housewife/man 1: yes 
0: no F=1.80 [0.18] F=1.82 [0.18] F=1.91 [0.17] F=1.83 [0.18] 
-0.01 (0.04) -0.03 (0.05) -0.01 (0.07) -0.01 (0.08) Obligatory military /  
public service 
1: yes 
0: no F=0.07 [0.79] F=0.44 [0.51] F=0.05 [0.82] F=0.04 [0.84] 
-0.06 (0.04) -0.04 (0.05) -0.05 (0.06) -0.07 (0.08) Non-working, other 1: yes 
0: no F=2.00 [0.16] F=0.66 [0.42] F=0.63 [0.43] F=0.82 [0.37] 
0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) Number of adults in the 
respondent’s 
household 
1: one adult 
2: two adults  F=0.31 [0.58] F=0.20 [0.65] F=0.01 [0.93] F=0.03 [0.85] 
-0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) Number of children in 
the respondent’s 
household 
0: no children 
…
3: three or more children  F=0.69 [0.41] F=0.77 [0.38] F=0.00 [0.95] F=0.23 [0.63] 
-0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.00 (0.01) Family after-tax 
income 
1: lowest income class 
…
10: highest income class F=0.12 [0.73] F=0.05 [0.83] F=0.02 [0.89] F=0.00 [0.98] 
-0.00* (0.00) -0.00* (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) Age Age of respondent in years 
F=5.20 [0.02] F=4.83 [0.03] F=2.86 [0.09] F=2.53 [0.11] 
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Table S9a. Breakdown of the samples in Germany, Cyprus, and France 
  Germany Cyprus France 
  Sample: 167 obs.  
Sample: 130 
obs.  
Sample: 223 
obs.  
  N % N % N % 
Gender Male 96 57.49 73 56.15 117 52.47 
Female 71 42.51 57 43.85 106 47.53 
Yes 97 58.08 75 57.69 154 69.06 Partner in the 
household No 70 41.92 55 42.31 69 30.94 
Yes --- --- 37a 28.46 --- --- Living with 
parents No --- --- 93 71.54 --- --- 
0 123 73.65 82 63.08 102 45.74 
1 18 10.78 18 13.85 45 20.18 
2 15 8.98 23 17.69 46 20.63 
Number of 
children in the 
household 
3 or more 11 6.59 7 5.38 30 13.45 
1 32 19.16 9 6.92 18 8.07 
2 44 26.35 25 19.23 30 13.45 
3 37 22.16 24 18.46 41 18.39 
4 37 22.16 31 23.85 49 21.97 
Family after-
tax income 
class 
5 17 10.18 41 31.54 85 38.12 
Welfare recipient or 
unemployed 7 4.19 2 1.54 7 3.14 
Occupational 
group 
Blue-collar worker 10 5.99 2 1.54 6 2.69 
White-collar worker 83 49.70 40 30.77 48 21.52 
Civil servant 13 7.78 40 30.77 29 13.00 
Pupil, student, trainee 34 20.36 30 23.08 102 45.74 
Self-employed 7 4.19 13 10.00 13 5.83 
Pensioner 10 5.99 0 0.00 6 2.69 
Housewife, -man 3 1.80 3 2.31 12 5.38 
Education Below 9 years of 
education 1 0.60 4 3.08 0 0.00 
Completed Extended 
Elementary School 21 12.57 8 6.15 13 5.83 
Completed Special 
Secondary School 39 23.35 --- --- 43 19.28 
Completed Secondary 
School 65 38.92 65 50.00 37 16.59 
Technical 
School/University degree 41 24.55 53b 40.77 130 58.30 
0 31 18.56 9 6.92 37 16.59 
1 55 32.93 34 26.15 72 32.29 
Number of 
siblings during 
childhood 2 47 28.14 40 30.77 59 26.46 
3 or more 34 20.36 47 36.15 55 24.66 
Note. The threshold of the first “family-after tax income class” is the country-specific poverty line for a single 
childless adult. Then, we add increments such that the mean of the third income class is about the mean 
household income in the respective country.  
a
 One of the respondents who were living with their parents also had a partner and two children. 
b
 14 out of the 53 highly educated respondents in Cyprus had finished a technical school (3 years of higher 
education). 
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Table S9b. Breakdown of the samples in China, India, and Botswana 
  Botswana China India 
  Sample: 159 obs.  
Sample: 196 
obs.  
Sample: 214 
obs.  
  N % N % N % 
Gender Male 70 44.03 130 66.33 136 63.55 
Female 89 55.97 66 33.67 78 36.45 
Yes 89 55.97 146 74.49 --- --- Partner in the 
household No 70 44.03 50 25.51 --- --- 
1 --- --- --- --- 12 5.61 
2 --- --- --- --- 73 34.11 
3 --- --- --- --- 35 16.36 
4 --- --- --- --- 56 26.17 
5 --- --- --- --- 22 10.28 
6 --- --- --- --- 10 4.67 
Number of 
adults in the 
household 
7 or more --- --- --- --- 6 2.80 
0 48 30.19 159 81.12 74 34.58 
1 26 16.35 27 13.78 48 22.43 
2 40 25.16 7 3.57 62 28.97 
Number of 
children in 
the 
household 3 or more 45 28.30 3 1.53 30a 14.02 
1 10 6.29 42 21.43 4 1.87 
2 18 11.32 47 23.98 22 10.28 
3 48 30.19 56 28.57 24 11.21 
4 42 26.42 32 16.33 39 18.22 
5 41 25.79 19 9.69 37 17.29 
Family after-
tax income 
class 
6 --- --- --- --- 88 41.12 
Welfare recipient or 
unemployed 30 18.87 4 2.04 8 3.74 
Occupational 
group 
Blue-collar worker 19 11.95 11 5.61 26 12.15 
White-collar worker 24 15.09 5 2.55 41 19.16 
Civil servant 53 33.33 5 2.55 23 10.75 
Pupil, student, trainee 15 9.43 140 71.43 54 25.23 
Self-employed 13 8.18 28 14.29 42 19.63 
Pensioner 2 1.26 0 0.00 9 4.21 
Housewife, -man 3 1.89 3 1.53 8 3.74 
Farmer --- --- --- --- 3 1.40 
Education No schooling --- --- 4 2.04 1 0.47 
Basic schooling 5 3.14 16 8.16 3 1.40 
Completed Primary 
School 7 4.40 9 4.59 15 7.01 
Completed Junior High 
School 21 13.21 13 6.63 44 20.56 
Completed High School 39 24.53 147 75.00 93 43.46 
Technical 
School/University degree 87 54.72 7 3.57 58 27.10 
0 31 19.50 71 36.22 33 15.42 
1 20 12.58 58 29.59 52 24.30 
2 27 16.98 35 17.86 47 21.96 
Number of 
siblings 
during 
childhood 3 or more 81 50.94 32 16.33 82 38.32 
Age group Less than 20 --- --- --- --- 49 22.90 
Between 20 and 40 --- --- --- --- 127 59.35 
40 or more --- --- --- --- 38 17.76 
Living area Urban 107 67.30 104 53.06 190 88.79 
Rural 52 32.70 92 46.94 24 11.21 
Note. The threshold of the first “family-after tax income class” is the country-specific poverty line for a single 
childless adult. Then, we add increments such that the mean of the third income class is about the mean 
household income in the respective country. 
a
 In India. 8 households have 4 children. 2 households have 5 children, 3 households have 6 or more children. 
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Table S10. Summary of seemingly unrelated regressions. Endogenous variable: equivalence scales 
stated by respondents. Standard errors in parentheses. P-values of F-tests in brackets.  
*** P<0.001, ** P<0.01, * P<0.05. 
 Germany (835 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Constant 0.99
***
(0.02) 
1.03***
(0.04) 
1.09***
(0.06) 
1.27***
(0.04)
1.26***
(0.06)
1.30***
(0.07) 
1.36***
(0.09)
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
271.22***
(8.70)
482.93***
(14.83)
698.54***
(22.10)
215.65***
(16.25)
460.07***
(20.27)
674.65***
(25.43)
886.86***
(32.62)
Dummy reference 
income 1,270 Euros 
-0.01
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.00
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.05)
Dummy reference 
income 2,032 Euros 
0.01
(0.01)
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.04)
0.03
(0.03)
0.02
(0.03)
0.03
(0.04)
0.02
(0.05)
Dummy reference 
income 2,794 Euros 
-0.00
(0.01)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.05)
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.63 0.62 0.24 0.46 0.53 0.54 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.30
[0.83]
0.30
[0.82]
0.22 
[0.88]
0.87 
[0.46]
0.54
[0.66]
0.46 
[0.71]
0.22 
[0.88]
 France (1,115 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Constant 1.03
***
(0.03) 
1.07***
(0.05) 
1.08***
(0.07) 
1.26***
(0.04)
1.26***
(0.06)
1.25***
(0.08) 
1.24***
(0.10)
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
234.33***
(10.56)
437.75***
(17.86)
621.02***
(25.08)
202.54***
(14.63)
411.23***
(19.94)
604.04***
(26.93)
786.70***
(34.67)
Dummy reference 
income 1,312 Euros 
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.04)
0.00
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)
0.00
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.05)
Dummy reference 
income 2,100 Euros 
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.04)
-0.00
(0.02)
-0.00
(0.03)
-0.00
(0.04)
-0.00
(0.05)
Dummy reference 
income 2,887 Euros 
-0.00
(0.02)
-0.00
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.01
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.06)
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.42 0.43 0.20 0.35 0.39 0.40 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.43
[0.73]
0.36
[0.78]
0.26 
[0.85]
0.21 
[0.89]
0.16
[0.92]
0.05 
[0.98]
0.04 
[0.99]
 Cyprus (650 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Constant 1.08
***
(0.05) 
1.19***
(0.09) 
1.28***
(0.14) 
1.24***
(0.07)
1.31***
(0.10)
1.43***
(0.14) 
1.52***
(0.17)
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
192.68***
(9.22)
351.77***
(15.89)
519.77***
(23.82)
168.68***
(12.35)
321.83***
(16.84)
499.02***
(23.29)
661.18***
(29.20)
Dummy reference 
income 774 Euros 
-0.03
(0.02)
-0.04
(0.04)
-0.07
(0.06)
0.01
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.06)
-0.06
(0.07)
Dummy reference 
income 1,238 Euros 
-0.00
(0.02)
0.00
(0.04)
-0.00
(0.06)
0.02
(0.03)
0.01
(0.04)
0.01
(0.06)
0.01
(0.08)
Dummy reference 
income 1,702 Euros 
0.01
(0.02)
0.02
(0.04)
0.02
(0.06)
0.02
(0.03)
0.02
(0.05)
0.03
(0.06)
0.03
(0.08)
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.30 0.45 0.49 0.52 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.76
[0.52]
0.73
[0.53]
0.76 
[0.52]
0.15 
[0.93]
0.26
[0.85]
0.30 
[0.82]
0.40 
[0.75]
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Table S10 (continued).
 India (1,070 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Constant 1.09
***
(0.10) 
1.25***
(0.15) 
1.39***
(0.22) 
1.19***
(0.11)
1.19***
(0.16)
1.32***
(0.22) 
1.31***
(0.29)
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
110.65***
(6.69)
200.92***
(9.67)
308.39***
(14.48)
134.11***
(7.39)
245.18***
(10.72)
357.38***
(14.45)
467.95***
(18.95)
Dummy reference 
income 552 Euros 
-0.01
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.06)
-0.02
(0.09)
0.01
(0.05)
-0.00
(0.07)
-0.02
(0.09)
-0.02
(0.12)
Dummy reference 
income 967 Euros 
-0.02
(0.04)
-0.02
(0.06)
-0.03
(0.09)
-0.02
(0.05)
-0.02
(0.07)
-0.03
(0.09)
-0.04
(0.12)
Dummy reference 
income 1,381 Euros 
0.01
(0.04)
0.01
(0.06)
0.02
(0.10)
0.01
(0.05)
0.01
(0.07)
0.01
(0.10)
0.01
(0.13)
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.38 0.39 0.31 0.42 0.46 0.47 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.15
[0.93]
0.07
[0.97]
0.08 
[0.97]
0.15 
[0.93]
0.07
[0.98]
0.09 
[0.96]
0.05 
[0.99]
 China (980 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Constant 1.47
***
(0.11) 
1.67***
(0.22) 
1.93***
(0.37) 
1.49***
(0.12)
1.80***
(0.20)
2.13***
(0.31) 
2.68***
(0.44)
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
139.39***
(8.09)
295.82***
(16.83)
411.41***
(27.73)
78.42***
(9.27)
227.80***
(15.01)
386.69***
(23.30)
529.31***
(33.52)
Dummy reference 
income 497 Euros 
0.03
(0.03)
0.01
(0.06)
-0.05
(0.09)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.05)
-0.09
(0.08)
-0.17
(0.11)
Dummy reference 
income 993 Euros 
0.01
(0.03)
-0.04
(0.06)
-0.19*
(0.10)
-0.01
(0.03)
-0.08
(0.05)
-0.16*
(0.08)
-0.23*
(0.12)
Dummy reference 
income 1,987 Euros 
0.00
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.06)
-0.16
(0.10)
-0.03
(0.03)
-0.09
(0.05)
-0.15
(0.09)
-0.19
(0.12)
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.15 0.29 0.32 0.29 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.32
[0.81]
0.24
[0.87]
1.56 
[0.20]
0.56 
[0.64]
1.10
[0.35] 
1.68 
[0.17] 
1.75 
[0.16] 
 Botswana (477 observations) 
 1 adult,  
1 child 
1 adult,  
2 children 
1 adult,  
3 children 
2 adults,  
0 children 
2 adults,  
1 child 
2 adults,  
2 children 
2 adults,  
3 children 
Constant 1.40
***
(0.15) 
1.56***
(0.28) 
1.61***
(0.44) 
1.15***
(0.24)
1.47***
(0.31)
1.56***
(0.43) 
1.75***
(0.59)
Reciprocal of 
reference income 
115.85***
(9.75)
233.90***
(17.48)
351.55***
(26.97)
122.06***
(14.57)
249.05***
(19.01)
388.31***
(26.73)
527.51***
(36.21)
Dummy reference 
income 381 Euros 
0.03
(0.04)
0.07
(0.08)
0.10
(0.12)
0.01
(0.07)
0.01
(0.09)
0.03
(0.12)
0.01
(0.16)
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.18 0.33 0.38 0.38 
F test statistic  for 
exclusion of all 
reference income 
dummy variables 
0.69
[0.41]
0.68
[0.41]
0.63 
[0.43]
0.01 
[0.91]
0.02
[0.88] 
0.08 
[0.78] 
0.01 
[0.93] 
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 Figure S1. Box plots of stated Likert-scale values for the reference household.  
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Figure S2. Box plots of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations for different household types at a 
reference income of 500 Euros. 
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Figure S3. Box plots of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations for different household types at a 
reference income of 1,250 Euros. 
Normalized Likert-scale evaluations, reference income = 1,250 Euros
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Figure S4. Box plots of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations for different household types at a 
reference income of 2,000 Euros.
Normalized Likert-scale evaluations, reference income = 2,000 Euros
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Figure S5. Box plots of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations for different household types at a 
reference income of 2,750 Euros. 
Normalized Likert-scale evaluations, reference income = 2,750 Euros
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Figure S6. Box plots of Normalized Likert-scale Evaluations for different household types at a 
reference income of 3,500 Euros. 
Normalized Likert-scale evaluations, reference income = 3,500 Euros
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Survey Instrument 
Documentation
 51
Information on the connection between a household’s demographic composition and 
the level of material comfort that its income can buy for its members is important for 
researchers in diverse disciplines. This survey instrument is designed so as to obtain 
direct estimates of this connection from respondents.  
The survey was implemented in automated and electronic form by a professional 
research institute, FORSA (“Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung und statistische 
Analysen mbH” – Research Institute for Social Research and Statistical Analyses). 
Each participating household was equipped with a “set-top-box” that provided 
Internet access and that was linked to the household’s television set.  
An introduction addressed to respondents provides a short explanation of the survey 
topic and a clarification of the concepts that follow. The actual questionnaire consists 
of two Parts, Part A and Part B. Part A contains the main evaluation task: to provide 
incomes that equalize the level of material comfort across different hypothetical 
household types. Part B poses the same assessment problem as in Part A, but using 
a different means of communication. Respondents are asked to assess the material 
comfort of different hypothetical household types with specific income levels on Likert 
scales.  
Key advantages of the survey instrument: 
x Direct assessments of incomes that equalize the level of material comfort of 
different household types, enabling the quantification of household-size 
economies. 
x Posing the same evaluation problem using different means of communication in 
Parts A and B allows for a test of the effectiveness of the survey instrument, 
suggested in Part A. 
x Relevance of the main evaluation task with observable characteristics of the 
respondent enables a test of effectiveness of the survey instrument. The socio-
economic and demographic composition of the respondent’s household, may limit 
her/his available information and ability to evaluate hypothetical household types 
and levels of material comfort, thus contaminating the results due to a limited-
information bias. Comparing answers from respondents whose socio-economic 
and demographic characteristics are close to those of the hypothetical 
households they examine with answers from all other respondents enables a test 
for limited-information bias. 
x  Low respondent burden: respondents can complete the questionnaire 
(Introduction, Parts A and B) in about 10-25 minutes. 
x High flexibility: Parts A and B can be adjusted easily so as to encompass other 
hypothetical household types and levels of material comfort. 
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Introduction for the 
respondents
 53
Purpose of the survey 
In general, different household types may need different incomes in order to attain 
the same level of material comfort. Since assessing such incomes in an objective 
way is difficult, we would like to ask you for your personal evaluation of these 
incomes for a number of different household types. Please note that in this 
questionnaire there are no “right” or “wrong” answers. So, your answers should only 
reflect your personal judgements. 
[Technical note to the researcher. Respondents click a button to switch to the next 
screen.] 
Instruction 
You will frequently read the expression “monthly net household income.” Such a 
“monthly net household income” is the income amount a household has at its 
disposal after paying taxes and social security contributions (health insurance 
contributions, compulsory long term care insurance contributions, unemployment 
insurance contributions, and contributions to the pension system).  
 “Monthly net household income” encompasses: 
Salary and earnings, 
Income from being self-employed, 
Pensions, 
Unemployment benefits and social benefits, 
Accommodation allowance, 
Child allowances, 
Incomes from rent and lease, and  
Other incomes such as returns on investment, interest, etc. 
[Technical note to the researcher. Respondents click a button to go to the next 
screen.] 
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PART
A
 55
Now, please think about a situation where a single, childless adult has a monthly net 
household income of 500 Euros.  
In this survey, there are seven other household types: 
with 1 adult and 1 child 
with 1 adult and 2 children 
with 1 adult and 3 children 
with 2 adults and no children 
with 2 adults and 1 child 
with 2 adults and 2 children 
with 2 adults and 3 children 
Assume that adults are ages 35 to 55 and children are ages 7 to 11. 
[Technical note to the researcher. Respondents click a button to go to the next 
screen.] 
Which monthly net household income would each of these seven household types 
need in order to attain the same level of material comfort as the single, childless, 
adult household with the monthly net household income of 500 Euros? 
You should state this monthly net household income for each household type in the 
table that will follow on the next screen. Please note that your answers should reflect 
only your personal judgements. 
[Technical note to the researcher. Respondents click a button to go to the next 
screen.] 
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Which monthly net household income would each household type need in order to 
attain the same level of material comfort as the single, childless, adult household with 
the monthly net household income of 500 Euros? 
Please state income amounts in Euros. 
1 adult without children 500 Euros 
1 adult, 1 child  
1 adult, 2 children  
1 adult, 3 children  
2 adults, no children  
2 adults, 1 child  
2 adults, 2 children  
2 adults, 3 children  
[Technical note to the researcher. The reference income level provided in the table is 
randomly assigned to the respondents. If a respondent does not report an income 
amount for a household type, there is a reminder: “please fill in income amounts in all 
empty cells of the table.” If a respondent’s entries are not numbers, there is a 
reminder: “please state numbers only.” If a respondent states income amounts that 
are decreasing inversely with household size, a box opens: “Usually, larger 
household types also need higher incomes in order to attain a specific living 
standard. Please, make sure that you are not stating how much income should be 
added compared to a smaller household type, but how much the total net household 
income should be. Please make sure that the entries you made are indeed total net 
household incomes.” This box opens only once, and its intention is to reduce 
misunderstandings by respondents. However, if a respondent did not adjust the 
entries she/he made in the table, she/he was free to do so. Respondents click a 
button to go to the next screen.] 
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PART
B
 58
We will show you several household types with a given monthly net household 
income. Please evaluate the material comfort that these monthly net household 
incomes bring to the different household types on a scale ranging from 1 to 100 
points. The values of this scale have the following meaning:  
Please complete the following table by evaluating the monthly net income of each 
household type on the scale of 1-100. 
All values between 1 and 100 are permissible. 
 Level of 
material
comfort 
(in points) 
1 adult, no children with 3,500 Euros  
1 adult, 1 child with 3,900 Euros  
1 adult, 2 children with 4,200 Euros  
1 adult, 3 children with 4,550 Euros  
2 adults, no children with 4,850 Euros  
2 adults, 1 child with 5,250 Euros  
2 adults, 2 children with 5,550 Euros  
2 adults, 3 children with 5,850 Euros  
[Technical note to the researcher. The numbers provided in this table are estimates 
of average equivalent incomes for five reference income levels from an independent 
study. The five reference incomes are the same as the reference income levels in 
Part A. So, altogether, five profiles of equivalent incomes (including a reference 
income for the single, childless, adult household) were evaluated by the survey 
sample, one profile per respondent. One out of these five equivalent-income profiles 
was randomly assigned to a respondent. If a respondent reports less than eight Likert 
scale values, there is a reminder: “please fill in all empty cells of the table.” If a 
respondent’s answers do not fall in the given range of the Likert scale (1-100), there 
is a reminder to “please state numbers between 1 and 100 only.”] 
10 50 30 1 70 100 90
very bad bad sufficient good very good 
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